



Washington, D.C. 20505

4 October 2019

Mr. Thomas Rid  
Professor of Strategic Studies  
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies  
1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20036

Reference: F-2019-02545

Dear Mr. Rid:

This is a final response to your 20 September 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, received in the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator on 26 September 2019, for **the following document: Thomas M. Troy, "Headquarters Germany," Studies in Intelligence, vol 42, nr 1, 1998, pp. 79-84. You advised that an already released CIA document refers to this review:**  
[https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DCO\\_0000477271\\_0.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DCO_0000477271_0.pdf).

We assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding so that we can identify it easily.

We conducted a search of our previously released database and located the document, consisting of four pages, responsive to your request.

If you have questions regarding our response, you may seek assistance from CIA's FOIA Public Liaison. You may reach the FOIA Public Liaison at:

703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline)

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark Lilly".

Mark Lilly  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure



Unclassified

[Next](#)[Previous](#)[Contents](#)

## Headquarters Germany: die USA Geheimdienste in Deutschland (U)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE ☐  
DATE: 12-29-2008

By Klaus Eichner and Andreas Dobbert. Berlin: edition ost, 1997.

Reviewed by 

(b)(3)

Markus Wolf, chief of the foreign intelligence administration of the former East German Ministry for State Security, tells in his autobiography *Man Without A Face* how in 1990 a senior-level CIA official tried to gain his cooperation to help the Agency find a "mole." Wolf turned down the CIA. This was unfortunate, because Wolf might have helped the Agency discover Aldrich Ames's treachery earlier than it did.

Klaus Eichner, co-author of *Headquarters Germany*, recounts in this book that a CIA officer ("Al Ford") in 1992 sought to persuade Eichner to cooperate with the Agency. The result was the same: Eichner said he could not be "bought" and turned down the pitch. If he had accepted, he probably never would have helped write this devastating book.

*Headquarters Germany* is a critical--occasionally scathing--expose of US intelligence activities in Germany. It dwells particularly on those activities directed against East Germany. Eichner worked as an analyst and later section chief in the counterintelligence (CI) section of Wolf's foreign intelligence administration for more than 33 years. Beginning in 1974, his specialty was the US intelligence services. Andreas Dobbert worked for the East German service for 12 years, starting in 1984. He also specialized in the US intelligence services. Their book shows that they learned and know a great deal about CIA activities in Germany and had extensive knowledge about other US intelligence agencies. They occasionally discuss the British, French, and West German services, and it appears they also know much about them. But it is the US intelligence agencies, especially CIA, that they skewer. In the prologue, the authors claim that since 1990 "hardly a [public] word" had been spoken about US intelligence activities in Germany. Thus, *Headquarters Germany* is a "contribution to the history of...American intelligence services on the territory of Germany from the end of the hot war [World War II] to the end of the Cold War...." The authors admit that they have a subjective view, but they suggest that an interested reader will learn how US intelligence services worked in Germany and how the East German service worked to evaluate, counter, and "paralyze" the Americans.

A reader can discern that Eichner and Dobbert possibly had other motives. For example, they:

- Reveal the names (and at least a partial *curriculum vitae*) of hundreds of people they claim are CIA officers, including many still-active officers.
- Claim that about 5,000 CIA officers worked at one time or another in Germany.
- Ridicule CIA by making it appear the Agency frequently employed (and still employs) a kind of "gang that could not spy straight."
- Boast of the (truly impressive) CI successes of the small group of people who worked in the "American" section of the East German service.



- Emphasize the moral, intellectual, and operational superiority of those who served in and for the East German foreign intelligence service.
- Warn all Germans that the CIA is still operating in their country despite the dissolution of East Germany, the Soviet Union, and Communist systems in Europe.

Eichner and Dobbert doubtless wanted to make some money by exposing the CIA, but setting the record "straight" about the moral and operational superiority of the East German service appears to be quite important to them. Twice, they bemoan that the East German service unjustly has been accused of being "evil." They claim that the East German foreign intelligence service never resorted to "dirty tricks" or "special operations." Eichner and Dobbert admit that the East Germans can be accused of many things, but they avow that their service never planned to murder foreign leaders or stage political coups as the CIA did, nor murder Greenpeace activists as the French service did, nor cooperate with regimes that tortured their people as the West German service did.

The authors take the moral high ground in their first chapter, in which they describe the activities of US military and intelligence services in Germany during the final days of World War II and its immediate aftermath. They assert, for example, that the first thing the Americans did was to seek booty, including works of art and gold stolen from Jewish prisoners, and as much materiel as possible from what became the Soviet zone of occupation before July 1945, when the zones of occupation officially came into effect. According to Eichner and Dobbert, the Americans worked feverishly at Nordhausen and Peenemunde to steal complete rocket assemblies, rocket parts, and scientific-technical documents and to nab German rocket scientists. To show their "objectivity," Eichner and Dobbert admit that Soviets also grabbed rockets and rocket technicians and scientists.

Eichner and Dobbert describe the US operation codenamed "Overcast" (later "Paperclip"), whose goal was to allow Nazis and other war criminals into the United States, despite legislation banning the immigration of such people. The terrible Americans also helped Nazis escape through other countries by establishing ratlines. The authors repeat others' claims that the Vatican helped in the latter effort, and they devote four pages to discussing the case of Klaus Barbie. They also write about the US intelligence services using Nazis in Germany to spy against the Soviets and to help establish and man the "Gehlen organization"--later to become the West German intelligence service, the BND. The authors admit that the East German service did seek out Nazis and war criminals, but they claim the service did so only to counter them and bring them to justice.

By 1948, the Cold War was a fact of life, and Eichner and Dobbert write that many events appeared to the Americans to justify an "adventurous policy of covert operations." The authors implicitly criticize the West for overreacting to such events as the "replacement" of the Benes government [in Czechoslovakia], "which in the view of Western politicians was a Communist putsch." Soon thereafter, the Americans, with CIA in the lead, launched "Operation Bloodstone," which the authors describe as a "secret declaration of war against the Soviet Union, its allies...and all leftist and other forces that did not want to accept the will of the US." CIA soon began a campaign "to provoke or cause the overthrow of governments, to make murderous attacks and invasions against independent states, and to launch massive attacks on human rights in many parts of the world." The Americans would use anybody--Nazis, war criminals, common criminals--who at least professed to oppose the Soviet Union, its allies, and Communism.

Not so strangely, Eichner and Dobbert have little to say about what the Soviet Union was doing in this period. They do admit that the Soviets and the East Germans began to create rings of intelligence agents in Germany, but--they say--the West was doing the same. Moreover, it would be "ahistoric and incorrect" to say that one side was correct and the other wrong to spy against one another.

Germany--and especially West Berlin--became the principal battleground of the Cold War. According to Eichner and Dobbert, at the peak of the Cold War, the CIA had 1,700 personnel in West Germany and West Berlin. Thousands more were employed in the military intelligence services and worked at 200 facilities in 75 sites.



Eichner and Dobbert break no new ground in their introductory chapter, but, because they claim they are making a "contribution to history," they document their account with many footnotes and references to published works. They cleverly use material from the "enemy." Thus, among the people whose material they cite are Ray Cline, one-time CIA chief in Germany and Deputy Director for Intelligence; the head of CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI); a member of CSI's History Staff; retired members of the Directorate of Operations; and British, West German, and US historians and journalists.

Having "established" in their first chapter that CIA was ruthless and even murderous from its inception, Eichner and Dobbert spend the rest of their book exposing the activities of US intelligence agencies in Germany and West Berlin. They devote a chapter to the military intelligence agencies, one to discussing SIGINT collectors, and one to discussing some of the German organizations established, funded, or used by the CIA to collect information, disseminate propaganda, act as "staybehind units," and undermine the East German state.

In several chapters (and, actually, throughout the book), Eichner and Dobbert discuss CIA activities and the East Germans' efforts to identify and neutralize CIA officers. In this connection, the authors make the point that their service rarely identified CIA officers to the public (at the time of identification) because the East Germans essentially thought it best to "deal with the evil you know" and knew CIA would replace a "blown" operations officer with somebody new--and the East Germans would then have to identify him.

*Headquarters Germany* shows that the East Germans were very successful in identifying CIA employees, especially case officers (their main target) in Germany. The hundreds of names mentioned in the text "conveniently" include lists of CIA chiefs in Bonn, East Berlin, and in West Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich. The authors also include a 19-page annex that has an alphabetical listing of CIA officers and a 13-page annex with biographies of some of the senior CIA officers who served in Germany.

Eichner and Dobbert also tell "war stories" or anecdotes about a number of CIA officers, especially those that the KGB, East Germans, or Hungarians tried to recruit. The authors state, however, that to their knowledge the East Germans were never able to recruit a CIA officer.

In several of these war stories, Eichner and Dobbert essentially ridicule the CIA officers and claim that the latter were guilty of many fundamental tradecraft mistakes. The tenor of this book is revealed in the title of one chapter: "Working Against the Big Boy Was Mostly Fun."

Eichner and Dobbert repeatedly state that they were analysts, not operators, and they reveal no human sources of the East German service--except for those already caught, tried, and in prison. (In this category are two American military servicemen, Jeffrey M. Carney and James W. Hall, who worked for the East Germans and provided reams of important information.) *Headquarters Germany* shows that in East Berlin the service "bugged" the US Embassy to a fare-thee-well, bugged the apartments and houses of probably all US Embassy employees, mounted almost suffocating physical surveillance operations against all known or suspected CIA officers, intercepted and taped telephone conversations, used "unofficial collaborators" against CIA officers, and had technical and physical surveillance against political dissidents who spoke with Embassy and CIA officers.

The East Germans did not have physical control of West Berlin, but their service evidently worked there almost at will. Eichner and Dobbert refer several times to how easy it was to gain information about CIA officers in West Berlin. In one case, the East Germans used as an access agent an elderly woman who made friends with the mother-in-law of an Agency officer and gained entry to the officer's house. Eichner and Dobbert know about and report on the family squabbles, love lives, and many other aspects of the personal lives of CIA officers stationed in West Berlin.

The book also shows that the East Germans:

- Used double agents against the Agency, with as many as 11 being run at one time.



- Gained access agents by using false-flag recruitments. The authors claim that an East German case officer recruited a member of the Bavarian office of the German version of the FBI by posing as a CIA officer. James Hall was recruited by a Turkish national who worked in West Berlin for the East Germans and told Hall he was working for the Turkish service.
- Penetrated the West German foreign intelligence and CI services at seemingly every level. For example, the East Germans at one time "ran" the chief of West German CI. Because CIA officers were in liaison with these West German services, the East Germans easily gained information about them. (Curiously enough, Eichner and Dobbert do not include the names of many CIA officers who worked in liaison with the West Germans.)
- Recruited numerous access agents who provided large amounts of information about American personnel in the US Embassy in Bonn, in consulates, and in military bases.
- Tapped telephone lines throughout West Germany.
- Researched, analyzed, and stored publicly available information and telephone books and other material access agents provided. The authors claim, for instance, that their thorough reading of the newspapers printed by the US military in Frankfurt provided leads to CIA officers. (They paid particular attention to accounts of athletic competition because they discovered that people who were not listed in telephone directories were winning on-post competitions.) On several occasions, the authors note how valuable telephone directories from the Berlin Brigade were for them.
- Gained information from the KGB and East European services. Eichner and Dobbert say that Edward Lee Howard came to East Berlin in 1988 and told them that CIA had six East German agents. The East Germans checked and discovered that all the agents Howard knew about were in fact double agents controlled by East Berlin.
- Eichner and Dobbert mock the "cover" that CIA used for its officers in Germany. They claim that the East Germans had no problem in seeing through the cover names of offices, because the CIA seemed never to change the names. They also sneer at the cover used by analysts from the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) who made visits to East Germany and other East European countries. They seem to delight in describing mistakes and bungling.

The authors claim that, in writing their book, they did not have access to the information from their files (supposedly destroyed) and had to rely on their memories and publicly available information. Their reported lack of files might explain some of the curious gaps and some mistakes in *Headquarters Germany*. For example, Eichner and Dobbert report on many people stationed in Germany in the mid-1980s but have less to say about officers in Germany in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. The authors also misidentify as CIA officers a number of State Department personnel. Their biases explain some other mistakes, such as their assertion that the war in Korea was an example of the "rollback strategy of the Eisenhower administration."

As an indictment of the CIA, the book should be studied in the Agency. There are lessons in it for operations officers, for the Counterintelligence Center, for those involved in devising and maintaining cover, and for the DI.

---

served in the Directorate of Intelligence.

---

Unclassified

Next

Previous

Contents